敌占区（又作沦陷区）【英】

enemy-occupied area; occupied area

译文来源

[1]Mao Tse-tung: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Vol. 2) [C]. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965: 93.
[2]中央文献重要术语译文发布（2015年第五期）.via:
http://www.cctb.net/bygz/zywxsy/201508/t20150818_326095.htm

定义

敌占区，又作沦陷区，是指被敌国所占领或侵占的领土，和同时遭受到奴役和压迫的民众的总称。在我国“沦陷区”这一名词，一般特指从1931年“九一八事变”开始，历经1937年“卢沟桥事变”爆发，直至1945年抗日战争全面胜利为止，被日本帝国主义军队所武力侵占，并由其扶植和控制的汉奸傀儡政权，所直接统治下的广大国土和遭受严重压迫和蹂躏的广大民众（沦陷区.via：
http://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%B2%A6%E9%99%B7%E5%8C%BA）。
沦陷区主要包括东北、华北、华中和华南的大片地区。日本侵略者在沦陷区实行政治、经济和思想文化等各方面的残酷的殖民统治。在政治上他们实行“以华制华”政策。在东北建立了伪满洲国傀儡政权，并残酷推行“治安肃正”、“归屯并户”和“三光”政策，任意捕杀中国居民，镇压人民的反抗；在华北推行“治安强化运动”，强化伪军及伪政权，建立“治安军”等伪军组织，强化保甲制度，禁绝抗日活动;在华中华南占领区内，则利用汪伪军政力量，进行所谓“清乡运动”。在经济上日本侵略者采取“以战养战”的政策、对沦陷区进行疯狂的经济掠夺。在东北执行“工业日本、原料满洲”的殖民经济政策，掠夺煤炭、钢铁等战略物资；在华中、华北、华南实行所谓“中日合作”，加紧经济掠夺，并掌握全部经济权，大量掠夺粮食和棉花，掠夺土地和劳动力。在思想文化上日本侵略者在沦陷区内大力推行法西斯奴化教育，宣扬“共荣亲善”、“王道乐土”等奴化思想，并建立各种所谓文化宗教团体，以期“掌握民心”，巩固其统治。在日本侵略者残暴统治下，沦陷区人民过着暗无天日的奴隶生活，辗转于死亡线上。但人民不甘心做亡国奴，纷纷自发起来进行反抗，组织抗日武装或开展各种形式的斗争（沦陷区.via: http://kns.cnki.net/kns/brief/result.aspx?dbPrefix=CRPD）。
中国共产党领导的人民军队深入敌占区，发动群众，开展抗日游击战争，并建立了许多块敌后抗日根据地，使得日本帝国主义在其占领区的统治并不稳固，其占领区并不稳定，有的地区成为敌我双方经常争夺的游击区。随着抗日战争的胜利，日占区获得解放（敌占区.via:
http://kns.cnki.net/kns/brief/result.aspx?dbPrefix=CRPD）。

定义来源

[1] 沦陷区.via：
http://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%B2%A6%E9%99%B7%E5%8C%BA
[2] 沦陷区.via:
http://kns.cnki.net/kns/brief/result.aspx?dbPrefix=CRPD
[3] 敌占区.via:
http://kns.cnki.net/kns/brief/result.aspx?dbPrefix=CRPD

例句

1. 抗日游击战争战略问题的第三个问题，是建立根据地的问题。这个问题的必要性和重要性，是随着战争的长期性和残酷性而来的。因为失地的恢复须待举行全国的战略反攻之时。在这以前，敌人的前线将深入和纵断我国的中部，小半甚至大半的国土被控制于敌手，成了敌人的后方。我们要在这样广大的被敌占领地区发动普遍的游击战争，将敌人的后方也变成他们的前线，使敌人在其整个占领地上不能停止战争。我们的战略反攻一日未能举行，失地一日未能恢复，敌后游击战争就应坚持一日，这种时间虽不能确定，然而无疑是相当地长，这就是战争的长期性。同时敌人为了确保占领地的利益，必将日益残酷地镇压游击队。这样，长期性加上残酷性，处于低后的游击战争，没有根据地是不能支持的。——《毛泽东选集（第二卷）》，1960：418

1. The third problem of strategy in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is the establishment of base areas, which is important and essential because of the protracted nature and ruthlessness of the war. The recovery of our lost territories will have to await the nation-wide strategic counter-offensive; by then the enemy’s front will have extended deep into central China and cut it in two from north to south, and a part or even a greater part of our territory will have fallen into the hands of the enemy and become his rear. We shall have to extend guerrilla warfare all over this vast enemy-occupied area, make a front out of the enemy’s rear, and force him to fight ceaselessly throughout the territory he occupies. Until such time as our strategic counteroffensive is launched and so long as our lost territories are not recovered, it will be necessary to persist in guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s rear, certainly for a fairly long time, though one cannot say definitely for how long. This is why the war will be a protracted one. And in order to safeguard his gains in the occupied areas, the enemy is bound to step up his anti-guerrilla measures and, especially after the halting of his strategic offensive, to embark on relentless suppression of the guerrillas. With ruthlessness thus added to protractedness, it will be impossible to sustain guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines without base areas. -Quoted from Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Vol. 2), 1965: 93.

2. 依据河湖港汊发展游击战争，并建立根据地的可能性，客观上说来是较之平原地带为大，仅次于山岳地带一等。历史上所谓“海盗”和“水寇”，曾演过无数的武剧，红军时代的洪湖游击战争支持了数年之久，都是河湖港汊地带能够发展游击战争并建立根据地的证据。不过，各个抗日党派和抗日人民，至今尚少注意这一方面。虽然主观条件还不具备，然而无疑地是应该注意和应该进行的。江北的洪泽湖地带、江南的太湖地带和沿江沿海一切敌人占领区域的港汊地带，都应该好好地组织游击战争，并在河湖港汊之中及其近旁建立起持久的根据地，作为发展全国游击战争的一个方面。缺少了这一方面，无异供给敌人以水上交通的便利，是抗日战争战略计划的一个缺陷，应该及时地补足之。——《毛泽东选集（第二卷）》，1960：421

2. Objectively speaking, the possibilities of developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base areas are greater in the river-lake-estuary regions than in the plains, though less than in the mountains. The dramatic battles fought by “pirates” and “water-bandits”, of which our history is full, and the guerrilla warfare round the Hunghu Lake kept up for several years in the Red Army period, both testify to the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and of establishing base areas in the river-lake-estuary regions. So far, however, the political parties and the masses who are resisting Japan have given this possibility little attention. Though the subjective conditions are as yet lacking, we should undoubtedly turn our attention to this possibility and start working on it. As one aspect in the development of our nation-wide guerrilla warfare, we should effectively organize guerrilla warfare in the Hungtse Lake region north of the Yangtse River, in the Taihu Lake region south of the Yangtse, and in all river-lake-estuary regions in the enemy-occupied areas along the rivers and on the seacoast, and we should create permanent base areas in and near such places. By overlooking this aspect, we are virtually providing the enemy with water transport facilities; this is a gap in our strategic plan for the War of Resistance which must be filled in good time. -Quoted from Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Vol. 2), 1965: 96.

3. 大块和小块—— 一种可能，是敌占地区将占中国本部之大半，而中国本部完整的区域只占一小半。这是一种情形。但是敌占大半中，除东三省等地外，实际只能占领大城市、大道和某些平地，依重要性说是一等的，依面积和人口来说可能只是敌占区中小半，而普遍地发展的游击区，反居其大半。这又是一种情形。如果超越本部的范围，而把蒙古、新疆、青海、西藏算了进来，则在面积上中国未失地区仍然是大半，而敌占地区包括东三省在内，也只是小半。这又是一种情形。——《毛泽东选集（第二卷）》，1960：473

3. Big areas and little areas. There is a possibility that the enemy will occupy the greater part of Chinese territory south of the Great Wall, and only the smaller part will be kept intact. That is one aspect of the situation. But within this greater part, which does not include the three northeastern provinces, the enemy can actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of communication and some of the plains—which may rank first in importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of the occupied territory in size and population, while the greater part will be taken up by the guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere. That is another aspect of the situation. If we go beyond the provinces south of the Great Wall and include Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai and Tibet, then the unoccupied area will constitute the greater part of China’s territory, and the enemy-occupied area will become the smaller part, even with the three northeastern provinces. That is yet another aspect of the situation. -Quoted from Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Vol. 2), 1965: 147-148.

网络参考例句

例句 1：
外围军是一支具有统一战线性质的特殊武装，除了接受晋察冀边区少量补给外，保留独立建制，来去自由，它主要活动在日军统治比较严密的敌占区、游击区，具有地方性、独立性、擅长游击战等特点，为抗战胜利做出了不可或缺的贡献。——“晋察冀抗日根据地外围军的建立”，载于《江苏社会科学》2015年02期
The Peripheral army became a special force. It fought in enemy-occupied areas and guerrilla zones in spite of the fact that it was almost self-sufficient. It contributed a lot to the victory of the anti-Japanese war.

例句 2：
一方面无人机体积小、机动灵活、隐蔽性强，可以在敌占区上空进行长时间低空侦察；另一方面无人机可以携带多种传感器，能够精确地给出侦察目标的位置和运动信息，给战场指挥员提供决策依据。——“晋察冀抗日根据地外围军的建立”，载于《航空计算技术》2015年04期
On the one hand the UAV has the advantages of small volume, flexible, strong concealment, so it can investigate in enemy occupied areas for long time over low altitude; on the other hand, the UAV can carry a variety of sensors, can give the accurate location and movement information of objectives，to provide decision basis for the battlefield commander．

例句 3：
本文着重论述晋冀鲁豫抗日根据地，如何整理金融市场，在极其复杂困难的环境中发展生产，开展对敌占区贸易，积极进行货币战，统制物价，使根据地社会稳步发展。——“晋冀鲁豫抗日根据地的商业贸易”，载于《历史教学（高校版）》2007年12期
This paper pays attention to what the anti-Japan bases of Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu do to make the bases develop steadily. For example, to arrange the financial market, develop the production, start to the trade with the lost city, carry out the monetary war and control the prices.