思想物【英】

thought-entity; mental substance

译文来源

[1] Marx, K. & F. Engels. Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works (Vol. 3) [M]. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975: 344.
[2] mental substance. via: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_substance

定义

思想物，即精神实体，源于17世纪法国哲学家笛卡尔的二元论。他认为，根本的实在有二：一为思维性的（Thinking）实体，一为具有扩延性的（Extended）实体，即通常所谓的精神与物质之二分。意识和物质是两种绝对不同的实体，意识的本质在于思想，物质的本质在于广袤；物质不能思想，意识不会广袤；二者彼此完全独立，不能由一个决定或派生另一个。事实上两者都存在着差别。（二元论.via: http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=BX7nAqkibW4lCUT16CJ-Ny_O_K-pKUZpOwcpm-Afoz2gvpCJxZw8zDkPsq3yasyQ0sXCBg1_WLL62ME6x-oR_mvBQ_vOOHrABSyovofKk7fRiuGuPP9DOmoX7LERk4_i）物质遵循机械因果规律，在空间中表现其形态和规律；而精神在自身内遵从另一种因果规律，这种规律是靠反省和领悟认识的，不能像物质一样被观察到其真实的状况。这也就是说人的形体是物质的，受机械因果序列作用，而同时人却受着另一个不同因果序列的心灵指导，人可以在心灵的舞台上作和行为不一样的事情，但往往也会发自内心的谋划、坚持、充满热情的行动。（杨晓建，2008: 8-9）
二元论把物质的派生物精神当作完全脱离物质而独立的东西，因而不能科学地解决世界的本源问题。同时，由于它违背了科学所证明的基本事实，故也不能真正将物质与精神绝对独立的原则贯彻到底。笛卡尔为了说明物质实体和精神实体的来源，不得不承认上帝是“绝对的实体”，无论物质实体，还是精神实体，都得依赖于“上帝”。这样，他的二元论最后还是倒向了客观唯心主义的一元论。（二元论.via: http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=BX7nAqkibW4lCUT16CJ-Ny_O_K-pKUZpOwcpm-Afoz2gvpCJxZw8zDkPsq3yasyQ0sXCBg1_WLL62ME6x-oR_mvBQ_vOOHrABSyovofKk7fRiuGuPP9DOmoX7LERk4_i）

定义来源

[1] 二元论.via: http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=BX7nAqkibW4lCUT16CJ-Ny_O_K-pKUZpOwcpm-Afoz2gvpCJxZw8zDkPsq3yasyQ0sXCBg1_WLL62ME6x-oR_mvBQ_vOOHrABSyovofKk7fRiuGuPP9DOmoX7LERk4_i
[2] 杨晓建.对笛卡尔式的二元论的两种批评——莱尔与塞尔心智哲学比较研究[D].华东师范大学硕士学位论文，2008.

例句

1. 举动如此奇妙而怪诞、使黑格尔分子伤透了脑筋的整个观念，无非就是抽象，即抽象思维者，这种抽象由于经验而变得聪明起来，并且弄清了它的真相就决心在某些——虚假的甚至还是抽象的——条件下放弃自身，而用自己的异在，即特殊的、特定的东西，来代替自己的自在性、非存在，代替自己的普遍性和无规定性；——决心把那只是作为抽象、作为思想物而隐藏在它里面的自然界从自身释放出去，也就是说，决心抛弃抽象而看一看摆脱掉它的自然界。——《马克思恩格斯全集（第四十二卷）》，1979：177-178

1. This whole idea which behaves in such a strange and bizarre way, and which has given the Hegelians such terrible headaches, is from beginning to end nothing else but abstraction (i.e., the abstract thinker), which, made wise by experience and enlightened concerning its truth, resolves under various (false and themselves still abstract) conditions to abandon itself and to replace its self-absorption, nothingness, generality and indeterminateness by its other-being, the particular, and the determinate; resolves to let nature, which it held hidden in itself only as an abstraction, as a thought-entity, go forth freely from itself; that is to say, this idea resolves to forsake abstraction and to have a look at nature free of abstraction. -Quoted from Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works (Vol. 3), 1975: 344.

2. 正象自然界曾经被思维者禁锢在他的绝对观念、思想物这种对他本身说来也是隐秘的和不可思议的形式中一样，现在，当他把自然界从自身释放出去时，他实际上从自身释放出去的只是这个抽象的自然界，只是自然界的思想物，不过现在具有这样一种意义，即这个自然界是思想的异在，是现实的、可以被直观的、有别于抽象思维的自然界。——《马克思恩格斯全集（第四十二卷）》，1979：177-178

2. Just as nature lay enclosed in the thinker in the form of the absolute idea, in the form of a thought-entity—in a shape which was obscure and enigmatic even to him—so by letting it emerge from himself he has really let emerge only this abstract nature, only nature as a thought-entity—but now with the significance that it is the other-being of thought, that it is real, intuited nature—nature distinguished from abstract thought. -Quoted from Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works (Vol. 3), 1975: 345.

3. 先验对象是康德哲学的重要概念。在《纯粹理性批判》的A版中，它有内在的歧义：一方面是先验统觉的思想物，另一方面又被视为物自体。在B版中，康德只将先验对象当作物自体，取消了前者在A版中的歧义。但从批判哲学的整体来看，两者在含义上并不等同。前者只在理论哲学中出现，后者还有实践哲学的用途。另外，先验对象概念的歧义性使得它与先验统觉的关系也须作二分的解读。它作为先验统觉的思想物，两者有一致性；作为物自体，它们就不相关，真正与物自体相关的是自在主体。——《先验统觉的思想物抑或物自体？——康德先验对象概念歧义性之辨》，2015: 78

3. The transcendental object was an important concept in Kantian philosophy. In the A edition of Critique of Pure Reason, the transcendental object had an inherent ambiguity: it was on one hand understood as the thought-entity of the transcendental subject(apperception)，on the other hand as the thing-in-itself compared with A edition, Kant directly regarded it as the thing-in-itself in the B edition, so that he could remove its ambiguity in the A edition. But it was not identical with the thing-in-itself in the system of critical philosophy, because the former was an epistemological concept, while the latter could be also applied to the practical philosophy. Besides, due to the double meaning of the concept of the transcendental object，its relation with the transcendental apperception must be read as two-sided. When it was treated as the thought-entity of the transcendental apperception, they were a unity of opposites; when it was shown as thing-in-itself, they had no relation to each other. Moreover, what was truly connected to the thing-in-itself was the subject in itself. -Quoted from Thought-entity of the Transcendental Apperception or Thing-in-itself? 2015: 87.

网络参考例句

例句 1：
先验对象是康德哲学的重要概念。在《纯粹理性批判》的A版中，它有内在的歧义：一方面是先验统觉的思想物，另一方面又被视为物自体。在B版中，康德只将先验对象当作物自体，取消了前者在A版中的歧义。——“先验统觉的思想物抑或物自体？——康德先验对象概念歧义性之辨”，载于《哲学研究》2015年第9期
The transcendental object was an important concept in Kantian philosophy. In the A edition of Critique of Pure Reason, the transcendental object had an inherent ambiguity: it was on one hand understood as the thought-entity of the transcendental subject (apperception), on the other hand as the thing-in-itself. Compared with A edition, Kant directly regarded it as the thing-in-itself in the B edition, so that he could remove its ambiguity in the A edition.